Manpower Management in Indian Railways
4.1 Introduction Indian Railways is a labour intensive industry having a workforce of over 1.5 million regular employees with an annual wage bill amounting to about Rs.19037 crore. Productivity of costly physical assets owned by Indian Railways for carrying out its core business of transporting men and material all over the country is largely dependent on effective manpower management.
In the past couple of decades there have been vast changes in the operational technologies in Indian Railways by way of modernisation, electrification, computerisation and mechanisation of track maintenance. These changes, in turn, require a completely new approach to manpower planning.
4.2 Manpower Position in Indian Railways
Railway employees are working in various categories in the Zonal Railways and Productions Units. There are around 700 categories of staff divided into four Groups viz. Group A, B, C & D assigned according to working responsibilities. The manpower is mainly distributed in Open line & Construction Wings having Engineering, Signal & Telecommunication, Electrical, Administration, Accounts and Stores departments. Open line in addition has staff working in the Transportation, Mechanical, Commercial, Medical and Security departments.
The staff expenditure for 15,10,759 employees of the Indian Railways as on 31 March 2002 was 19037.20 crore. This is 51.42 per cent of gross expenditure and 48.37 per cent of gross revenue receipts. A comparison of present staff expenditure and staff cost with that of 1990-91 would reveal that the staff strength has reduced by about 8.54 per cent but the staff expenditure has gone up by 268.51 per cent.
The increasing staff cost and the magnitude of the cost in relation to gross expenditure and gross receipts only emphasises the importance of effective management of manpower over Indian Railways.
Despite instituting a mechanism of monitoring manpower strength, it was observed in audit that the manpower inventory maintained by the Railways was far from accurate. A review of the figures reported in the monthly PCDO's, the Annual statistical statements and the Book of Sanctions for the period 1999-2000 to 2002-03 revealed that all the figures were at variance with each other.
Compliance to Railway Board’s instructions of 1992 to reduce the sanctioned strength by three per cent and operated strength by two per cent was poor.
As against an expected reduction of 4,43,232 posts in sanctioned strength, reduction of 1,73,851 posts was achieved over a period of 11 years since issue of orders. The compliance by Northern and South Eastern Railways was particularly poor.
Reduction in operated strength was only 1,97,656 posts as against 3,12,038 posts expected over a period of 11 years. The compliance of South Eastern, Northern, Central and South Central Railways was far below the expected level. Non-achievement of expected reduction is burdening the Railway exchequer by Rs.1449 crore per annum.
Intake of Railway employees was to be restricted to one per cent per annum of men on roll in respect of Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, S&T, Transportation and Commercial departments and to 0.5 per cent in other departments. Compliance to this order was not achieved by most Railways. South Central Railway’s performance in this regard was particularly poor.
[Para 4.9.3 (i)]
Intake by way of compassionate appointments in essential categories was was excluded from the application the orders pertaining to restrictions of intake. This resulted in large scale recruitment through this mode. A total of 23498 compassionate appointments were made during 2000-01 to 2002-03 which was 49.91 per cent of total intake. Compassionate appointments were highest on Northern Railway.
The Zonal Railways flouted the orders of Railway Board by making compassionate appointments in non-essential categories. Audit found that 5306 appointments were made in non-essential categories.
[Paras 4.9.3 (iii) & (iv)]
During the period of review 1102 work studies were conducted and 63939 posts were identified as surplus. Out these 31195 posts were surrendered and staff working against 7300 posts was re-deployed elsewhere. 5921 posts were declared supernumerary and the staff working against these posts continued to serve with no justifiable work resulting in unproductive expenditure of Rs.52.52 crore.
Closure of 25 Carriage & Wagons maintenance yards in five Zonal Railways rendered 863 staff a surplus. Only 456 have been re-deployed so far. There has been delay in re-deployment. On Eastern Railway 282 staff still await redeployment.
Due to introduction of electric traction, two Diesel Loco Sheds were closed during review period. 153 staff of Mughalsarai Shed are yet to be redeployed.
(Paras 4.10.5 & 4.10.6)
Test check of availability of norms in Electrical, Mechanical and Civil departments revealed that for four, two & seven activities respectively, no norms existed. Where norms existed, detailed scrutiny revealed deployment of excess staff in coach maintenance activity (Mechanical) and track maintenance activity (Civil Engineering).
(Paras 4.12.1 & 4.12.2)
Benchmarking was introduced in Indian Railways as a method of rightsizing its manpower. The first benchmark introduced was in respect of track men per ETKM for track maintenance work. Northern and Central Railways were unable to achieve the benchmark even after 12 years of the issue of instructions.
Similar benchmarking exercise has been commenced for other activities only in 2000, a full nine years after recognizing the need to introduce it in all areas of Railways functioning.
Modernisation of Workshops has led to a number of staff being rendered as surplus. As on 31 March 2003, 2768 staff was yet to be redeployed. Apart from delay in re-deployment, retention of extra staff has led to unproductive expenditure of Rs. 73.06 crore in workshops affected by modernization.
Staff are justified in Workshops on the basis of outturn target and any achievement less than the fixed output is a reflection of excess staff. Staff numbering 5215 and 3459 were found excess on the basis of actual outturn which led to extra expenditure of Rs.66.05 crore and Rs.43.80 crore during the years 2001-02 and 2002-03 respectively.
(Paras 4.14.1 & 4.14.2)
In Civil and Electrical departments of Construction Organization 86, 153 & 70 Gazetted posts were operated in excess of requirement as per norms during the year 2000-01, 2001-02 and 2002-03 respectively resulting in extra expenditure of Rs.3.92 crore.
Delay in redeployment and non redeployment of 1413 and 333 staff rendered surplus after completion of sanctioned works in Construction Organisations of Northern and Central Railways has led to unproductive expenditure of Rs.30.01 crore and Rs.4.13 crore respectively.
Despite recognition of the system of providing peons at the residences of certain categories of officers as an anachronism that needs to be done away with, the system continues with 1008 Bungalow Peons being engaged as on 31March 2003. Engagement of Bungalow Peons was highest on South Eastern, Northern, Central, Northeast Frontier and Southern Railways.
Staff for newly created Zonal Railways in Group B, C & D cadres have been transferred only after obtaining their willingness. This resulted in transferring of 398 and 272 staff only from Western and Northern Railways as against 643 and 559 posts respectively required to be transferred to North Western Railway. Similarly only 136 and 318 staff from Eastern and North Eastern Railways was transferred as against 1961 and 688 staff respectively required to be transferred to East Central Railway. This has resulted in excess staff in the present Railways with no justifiable workload.
Ministry of Railways (Railway Board) has a full fledged Manpower Planning Directorate headed by Member (Staff) who is assisted by an Executive Director, Joint Directors and Directors. The Directorate takes all policy decisions for the management of manpower on Indian Railways.
At the Zonal Railway Headquarter, Chief Personnel Officer (CPO) implements the policies relating to the manpower management. CPO is assisted by Deputy Chief Personnel Officer/Senior Personnel Officers and Assistant Personnel Officers. A Planning Branch, under the control of CPO, is functioning in each Zonal Railway. The Planning Branch comprises the Corporate Planning Cell, the Efficiency Cell and Staff Inspection Units also called Work Study Cells. The Corporate Planning Cell draws up five year and 15 year Plans and prepares the annual integrated budget. The Efficiency Cell conducts work studies and suggests ways of minimising wages, steps for improving efficiency and effecting economy. Staff Inspection Unit conducts inspections of various departments to review staff requirements based on actual time studies of various activities of the department/ unit.
Senior Personnel Officers/ Personnel Officers and Assistant Personnel Officers look after the work of personnel management at Divisions and other units of the Railways.
4.5 Scope & Audit Objectives
This review is focused on the efficacy of efforts made by the Railways for achieving economy and increasing productivity in the context of technological changes taking place in open line & construction organisations. The specific areas of focus are -
Control systems available for monitoring the utilisation of manpower to ensure its efficiency & effectiveness; Norms/standards adopted for computation, allocation and actual deployment of manpower; Job analysis, job description & job specification for various categories of posts and Impact of reorganisation of Zonal Railways
4.6 Sample Size
At the macro level, records maintained in CPO’s office have been audited to review the adequacy of managerial and administrative controls. A general review of manpower relating to Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Engineering departments was undertaken. At the micro level the review was conducted on 19 Divisions (minimum of two Divisions in each Zonal Railway) with specific focus on all the electric and diesel loco sheds in the selected Divisions and 26 Workshops on nine (Nine Zonal Railways became eleven from 1 October 2002 and 16 from 1.4.2003 but for the purpose of this review they are reckoned as 9 Zonal Railways as per original jurisdictions.) Zonal Railways. Macro review covers the period from 1998-99 to 2002-03 and micro review from 2000-01 to 2002-03.
4.7 Manpower Planning
Manpower planning in any institution involves -
An appreciation or evaluation of existing manpower; Forecasting of manpower requirement for the future in terms of both quantity and quality; and
Taking of suitable measures to ensure that manpower is deployed according to the requirement of specific jobs.
Keeping in view the increasing trend in the wage packet of its employees, Indian Railway Corporate Plan 1985-2000 envisaged institution of a formal system of manpower planning. Railway Board appointed Rail India Technical and Economic Services Limited (RITES) in January 1990 to undertake a diagnostic study to identify the strengths and weaknesses of its current manpower.
RITES in its report (1991) had observed that the manpower deployment in various activities of the Railways was very high and recommended effective monitoring of manpower strength, reduction in staff by freezing of existing vacancies, putting a recruitment ban, ad-hoc cut in staff strength, introduction of voluntary retirement scheme, timely identification of surplus staff, controlling quality and level of recruitment, etc.
The progress made by Railways in implementing the recommendations along with other steps taken by Railway Board for manpower planning were reviewed in Audit and following observations are made:
4.8 Monitoring of Manpower Strength
Availability of accurate inventory of manpower in an institution is vital for effective utilisation of the resource. RITES in their report had observed that suitable manpower information for the purpose of monitoring was not readily available on the Railways or was insufficiently detailed. It was, therefore, recommended that manpower information system of the Railway may be redesigned and a system of reporting manpower strength at various levels be introduced which will force the field units to be realistic in setting manpower targets and achieving them.
4.8.1 In July 1992, Railway Board emphasised the need of setting up of a effective monitoring system at the Divisional, Zonal and Railway Board's level. The Divisional Authorities were to intimate every month to the Zonal Headquarter, the inflow/outflow of the staff (Group C and D) through every means of appointment/retirement including transfers from/to other units. Similarly the Zonal Railways were to intimate to the Board through monthly PCDO the number of posts at the beginning and end of every month indicating increase/ decrease in the sanctioned post (as per Book of Sanctions) and Operated posts.
Despite instituting a mechanism of monitoring manpower strength, it was observed in audit that the manpower inventory maintained by the Railways was far from accurate. A review of the figures reported in the monthly PCDO's, the Annual statistical statements and the Book of Sanctions for the period 1999-2000 to 2002-03 revealed that the figures were at variance with each other.
4.8.2 In August 2002, Railway Board taking note of huge variation in the figures appearing in the Annual Statistical Statements and those reported to them through PCDO, issued instructions to carry out census of employees and furnish unit wise details of all staff based on the paid salary bills. Census of staff on Zonal Railways was carried out only in respect of Group C & D employees. Even after carrying out the census, the figures of March 2003 in various records continued to be different.
4.9 Reduction in staff strength
In order to achieve reduction in the staff strength, RITES had suggested resorting to putting immediate ban on recruitment, ad-hoc cuts in staff strength, early retirement by offering some incentive in the shape of enhanced retirement benefits and voluntary retirement scheme. In May 1992 during the General Manager's conference, Chairman Railway Board had expressed that every year about three to four per cent staff retire and thus there was adequate scope for manpower planning. Zonal Railways were, therefore, directed to review the existing vacancies and surrender those which were not necessary. Instructions were also issued to achieve a reduction of three per cent in sanctioned strength and two per cent in operated strength.
The position of total sanctioned and operated strength of Group C and D on Indian Railway as on 31 march 1992 was compared with sanctioned and operated strength as on 31 March 2003 to ascertain the extent to which Board's instructions were implemented.
4.9.1 Audit scrutiny revealed that the sanctioned staff strength which stood at 16,67,851 as on 31 March 1992 was reduced to 14,94,000 as on 31 March 2003 achieving a reduction of 1,73,851 (10.42 per cent) as against 4,43,232 (28.47 per cent) required to be achieved at the rate of three per cent per annum over a period of 11 years. Railway wise position in achieving the expected reduction is discussed below:
On Northern Railway the reduction in sanctioned strength was a mere 1,221 (0.5 per cent) as against 70,052 (28.47 per cent) required.
South Eastern Railway achieved a reduction of 4,901 (2.22 per cent) as against 31,128 (14.13 per cent) required to be achieved between 1998-99 and 2002-03.
The reduction achieved by Central, Northeast Frontier, Southern, North Eastern, South Central, Western and Eastern Railways was 8.83 per cent, 10.50 per cent, 11.01 per cent, 12.25 per cent, 12.54 per cent, 14.53 per cent and 22.77 per cent respectively.
4.9.2 The operated strength of Group C and D which stood at 15,65,673 on 31 March 1992 was reduced to 13,68,017 as on 31 March 2003. The reduction achieved over a period of 11 years was 1,97,656 (12.62 per cent) as against 3,12,038 (19.93 per cent) required to be achieved at the rate of two per cent per annum over a period of 11 years. Thus due to non achievement of the reduction target in operated strength, Indian Railway is incurring extra expenditure of approximately Rs.1,449 crore per annum. Railway wise position in reduction of operated strength is given below:
As against the expected reduction of 39,503, 49,039, 42,894 and 25,035 by South Eastern, Northern, Central and South Central Railways, reduction was only 9,438 (4.76 per cent), 14,481 (5.89 per cent), 14,462 (6.72 per cent) and 11,236 (8.94 per cent) respectively.
The actual reduction achieved by North Eastern (12.48 per cent), Northeast Frontier (15.45 per cent), Southern (15.47 per cent), Central (17.12 per cent) and Western (17.44 per cent) was better than the Railways mentioned above.
[Annexure XXVIII (ii)]
4.9.3 Reduction of Manpower through restriction in recruitment
The intake of the Railway employees in various groups (Group A, B, C & D) is made by resorting to direct recruitment through Union Public Service Commission and Railway Recruitment Board, recruitment from open market, recruitment on compassionate grounds etc. RITES in its report had recommended immediate ban on recruitment. No action was taken till August 2000 when in view of the Government's policy of rightsizing its manpower, Railway Board issued instructions to Zonal Railways for restricting the intake of manpower to a maximum of one per cent per annum separately in Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, Signal & Telecommunication, Transportation & Commercial Departments and a maximum of 0.5 per cent of the men on roll for other departments. The restriction of one and 0.5 per cent was to include intake from all sources including inter department transfers but excluding compassionate appointments made in essential categories where no surpluses were likely to be generated in foreseeable future. These instructions were slightly modified in December 2001, when Railway Board permitted the General Managers/Divisional Railway Managers to decide the number of employees to be inducted in each department subject to overall intake limit of one per cent per annum to whole group of departments viz Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, Signal & Telecommunication, Transportation & Commercial and intake limit of 0.5 per cent to whole group of other departments.
(i) In view of the fact that intake limit of one per cent and 0.5 per cent was to be observed separately for each department up to December 2001, Audit reviewed department wise intake of manpower during the year 2001-02 and found that:
Six Zonal Railways failed to observe the one per cent intake limit in one or more departments. The excess intake in six departments was Mechanical (266), Transportation (258), Electrical (136), S&T (132), Commercial (75) and Civil (7) involving extra expenditure of Rs.11.07 crore per annum.
The excess was very high on South Central in Mechanical (264) and Electrical (90); Central in Transportation (213) and S&T (72); Southern in Commercial (59); South Eastern in Electrical (46) and Western in Transportation and Electrical (37 each).
Almost all the Zonal Railways except Northern failed to observe the 0.5 per cent intake limit in one or more departments. The excess intake was in Medical (271) followed by Administration (50), Personnel (44), Accounts (23) and stores (11). The extra expenditure involved was of Rs.5.04 crore.
The Railways where the excess intake in Medical department was very high are South Eastern (121), Central (59), in Eastern (48), and Western (22).
The total excess intake due to non-observance of Railway Board’s instruction aggregated to 1,273 resulting in financial burden of Rs.16.11 crore per annum.
[Annexure XXIX (i)]
(ii) As the intake limit of one and 0.5 per cent was to be observed for whole group of departments after December 2001, Audit undertook review of overall intake of manpower within the two groups of departments for the year 2002-03 and found that:
South Central Railway failed to observe the one per cent intake restriction for whole group of departments viz. Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, Signal & Telecommunication, Transportation & Commercial and exceeded the limit by 452 resulting in extra expenditure of Rs.5.72 crore per annum.
Similarly six employees were inducted in excess of prescribed intake limit of 0.5 per cent in other Departments of South Central Railway resulting in extra expenditure of Rs.0.07 crore per annum.
[Annexure XXIX (ii)]
(iii) Audit observed that by excluding the compassionate appointments in essential categories from the application of orders regarding restriction of intake limit, the Zonal Railways were prompted to resort to heavy recruitment on compassionate grounds defeating the very purpose of issuing orders to restrict recruitment. As against the total intake of 15,635 during 2000-01, 15,633 during 2001-02 and 15,813 during 2002-03, the intake through compassionate appointments was 7,178 (45.91 per cent), 7,932 (50.74 per cent) and 8,388 (53.04 per cent) respectively. Railways where the intake on compassionate grounds was very high are given below:
The intake through compassionate appointments was highest by Northern, Railway viz. 1,142 (70.89 per cent) as against the total intake of 1,611 during 2000-01, 1,410 (74.13 per cent) as against 1,902 during 2001-02 and 1,192 (82.32 per cent) as against 1,448 during 2002-03.
The intake of 497 (82.56 per cent) in 2000-01, 684 (62.82 percent) in 2001-02 and 498 (64.18 per cent) in 2002-03 as against total intake of 602, 1,089 and 776 respectively on Northeast Frontier Railway was also very high.
(iv) Not only was the intake through compassionate appointments very high, they were also in non-essential categories which is against the Railway Board's orders. On Southern Railway where the figures were available for all the years, it was seen that the intake on compassionate grounds in other than essential categories was 1,279. On Central and Northern Railways where the figures for the years 2001-02 and 2002-03 were available it was found that a total of 1,384 and 2,182 appointments were made in other than essential categories as against 696 and 420 respectively made in essential categories. The appointments in other than essential categories made by Eastern, Northeast Frontier and Western Railways during the year 2002-03 were 95, 19 and 347 respectively.
[Annexure XXIX (iii)]
4.9.4 Reduction of manpower through Early Retirement/Voluntary Retirement
RITES in their report had observed that an option available for reducing the size is to induce outflow from the organisation and suggested retirement of those above the age of 50 by offering some incentives in the form of enhanced benefits or weeding out on the basis of performance. Government of India introduced (February 2002) a ‘Special Voluntary Retirement Scheme’(SVRS) to all its Employees who have been declared surplus.
Scrutiny by Audit, however, revealed that despite a large number of employees on Zonal Railways having been declared surplus (as discussed in ensuing paragraphs), no action has been taken by Railway Board to introduce a similar scheme for its employees.
4.10 Timely identification of Surplus staff and their useful redeployment
In view of major technological changes taking place in the Indian Railway system it is imperative to identify activities that have become redundant and re-deploy the staff that become surplus. RITES in their report had recommended the concept of zero base budgeting in manpower planning at least once in five years as in such budgeting the Managers in the organisation had to justify presence of every employee. In each Zonal Railway Work Study Teams/ Staff Inspection Units (SIUs) undertake studies from time to time to identify such activities and suggest efficient methods of operation to effect manpower savings.
A review was undertaken to ascertain the impact of studies undertaken by Work Study Cells/ SIUs and following observations are made:
4.10.1 Every year in the month of February, Zonal Railways are required to send their annual work study programme to the Railway Board for approval. Apart from the work studies approved by Board, General Managers of Zonal Railways also approve some work studies (known as crash studies). The position of work study programmes submitted to Board, work studies approved by Board/ General Managers and work studies actually undertaken during the year 1998-99 to 2002-03 was reviewed in Audit and it was noticed that:
The work study programmes were not sent to Railway Board on due dates which caused delays in approval also. Out of a total of 1,304 work studies approved by Board/ GMs during the period from 1998-99 to 2002-03, 113 were not undertaken at all. Out 113 work studies not undertaken, 61 were on Central Railway. The reason put forth was “no saving potential exists”. South Central Railway did not take up 20 work studies for similar reasons. This only indicates that adequate care was not exercised by the Railways before drawing up the programmes for Railway Board/ GM's approval.
4.10.2 As soon as the Work Study Team completes the study, a report on its recommendations is prepared and submitted to CPO for approval. On receipt of approval, a copy of the report is sent to the department concerned for acceptance of recommendations. Simultaneously, a copy of the study report is also sent to the Railway Board for information. The findings of the SIU/Work Study Cell should be implemented within a period of three months and the posts identified as surplus should be surrendered/ re-deployed. The implementation of the accepted recommendations is followed up by the Central Planning Cell and progress in this regard is sent to the Railway Board every quarter.
The position of the work studies conducted during the period 1998-99 to 2002-03, number of posts identified as surplus and the follow up action taken to surrender/ re-deploy the surplus posts/ staff was reviewed in audit and it was found that:
In 1,102 work studies conducted, 63939 posts were identified as surplus. Out of these 31,195 posts were surrendered and staff working against 7,300 posts was re-deployed elsewhere. 5,921 posts were declared supernumerary and the staff working against these posts continued to serve with no justifiable work resulting in unproductive expenditure of Rs.52.52 crore.
4.10.3 Test check of 191 work study reports prepared and accepted by the concerned departments during the period 1999-2000 to 2001-02 was carried out to see the progress of implementation of recommendations. The check revealed the following:
Out of total of 8,281 staff working against posts identified as surplus, only 698 staff were re-deployed. The delay in re-deployment ranged between one month to 25 months, beyond the period of three months allowed as per instructions, resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.6.20 crore. The Railways where the implementation was slow resulting in heavy avoidable expenditure of more than one crore during the review period are depicted in the table below:
|Railway||No of staff||Period of delay in re-deployment||Avoidable expenditure (Rs. in crore)|
|North Eastern||133||Eight to 15 months||1.69|
|Eastern||207||Six to 21 months||1.50|
|South Eastern||104||Five to 25 months||1.30|
|Western||134||Seven to 15 months||1.05|
After acceptance of staff as surplus, 4306 posts were declared as supernumerary. However, there was delay ranging from one to 21 months in declaring such posts as supernumerary resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.5.11 crore. The Railways where there was delay in declaring the posts supernumerary resulting in heavy avoidable expenditure of more than one crore during the review period are depicted in the table below:
|Railway||No of staff||Period of delay in declaring the posts supernumerary||Avoidable expenditure(Rs. in crore)|
|Central||670||Three to 13 months||2.58|
|Northern||2896||One to 21 months||1.59|
The period for which the staff continued to work in supernumerary posts/ waiting for redeployment without any justification ranged from six months to 42 months involving unproductive expenditure of Rs.12.36 crore. The Railways on which the unproductive expenditure of more than Rs.1 crore was incurred are depicted in the following table:
|Railway||No of staff||Period for which posts remained supernumerary/waiting for redeployment||Avoidable expenditure( Rs. in crore)|
|Central||670||Six to 42 months||3.47|
|South Eastern||275||10 to 42 months||6.33|
|South Central||83||18 to 20 months||1.66|
[ Annexure XXXI]
4.10.4 Test check of 56 reports prepared and issued during the period 1999-00 to 2001-02 but not accepted or partially accepted by the concerned department revealed that 5,012 posts were identified as surplus by WSC/ SIU. Out of these recommendations regarding treating 2,393 posts as surplus were not acceptable to the department concerned. The reasons for non- acceptance were stated to be:
increase in workload,
cadre restructuring under process,
scrutiny of work study reports yet to be completed,
scientific study of work load not done.
There has been delay ranging from two to 41 months in taking decision either to accept the recommendations of the SIUs/ Work Study Cells or to furnish proper justification for continuance of these posts. The avoidable expenditure incurred on this account works out to Rs.49.37 crore. The Railways where the avoidable expenditure of more than one crore has been incurred are depicted in the table below:
|Railway||No. of posts not accepted/ decision awaited||Period for the which the posts are under dispute||Avoidable expenditure(Rs. in crore)|
|Central||966||10 to 41 months||34.97|
|Western||554||Seven to 20 months||6.11|
|Eastern||236||Nine to 25 months||3.51|
|Southern||173||11 to 27 months||2.16|
|South Eastern||80||Five to 25 months||1.33|
4.10.5 During discussion of RITES recommendations on Manpower planning in Mechanical Department in May 1991, Member (Staff) had mentioned that due to closure of various yards, carriage and wagons maintenance staff rendered surplus may be identified and action taken to re-deploy such staff. Audit scrutiny in this regard revealed that:
Closure of 25 carriage & wagon maintenance yards on five Zonal Railways up to March 2003, rendered 863 staff as surplus. Out of this, 456 staff was re-deployed.
Delay in redeployment of 51 staff on Central Railway ranged from two to 18 months resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.0.15 crore.
On Western Railway 94 staff were re-deployed after delay of seven months resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.0.07 crore.
Delay in re-deployment of 25 staff on South Eastern Railway has resulted in avoidable expenditure of Rs.0.17 crore.
On Eastern Railway 282 staff was still awaiting re-deployment. Details regarding the date from which the posts were rendered as surplus was not available on records.
4.10.6 Due to introduction of electric traction on almost all major routes of the Railways, there has been general shift from Diesel Locomotives to Electric Locomotives. On most of such sections, the Diesel maintenance sheds have been closed or the work load has decreased significantly.
A review of diesel maintenance activity on all the selected Divisions of nine Zonal Railways was carried out and it was found that only two Diesel Sheds - one at Mughalsarai over Lucknow Division of Northern Railway and one at Angul over Khurda Road Division on South Eastern Railways were closed during the year 2001-02 and 2002-03 respectively. On Northern Railway 338 staff was rendered surplus. Out of this 153 staff was deployed after a delay 16 months resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.2.58 crore. All the 41 staff rendered as surplus on South Eastern Railway were re-deployed.
4.11 Forecasting of Manpower Requirement
An assessment of future manpower requirements is essential for planning recruitment levels and developing redeployment strategies. In order to use the existing manpower judiciously and take decision regarding recruitment, it is essential that proposals for staff requirement of various activities are prepared well in advance by adopting certain yardsticks/ norms.
A review of records of Zonal Railways conducted in this regard revealed that proposal for future requirements of staff were not prepared annually in advance except for Construction Organisation and Running staff (Guard, Drivers etc.) in open line. The proposals for requirement of staff in all other activities were processed as and when need arose.
4.12 Availability of norms/ yardsticks and their observance
Availability of norms/ yardsticks for deployment of staff in various activities and their correct application is an essential tool for manpower management.
Test check on availability of norms was carried out in three major departments viz. Electrical, Mechanical and Civil Engineering and it was found that:
In Electrical Department, out of 11 major activities, norms for staff deployment in four activities viz. Maintenance of AC Coaches and Train lighting, Sub-station maintenance, Administrative work (non-gazetted staff) and Headquarter office work (Gazetted staff) were not available except on Eastern and South Eastern Railways. On Eastern and South Eastern Railways out of the four activities mentioned above norms for maintenance of AC Coaches and Train lighting were available.
In Mechanical Department, out of five activities, norms for one activity viz. staff deployment for wagons maintenance were available only on Eastern, South Eastern and Western Railways. Norms for administrative work and Divisional work (Gazetted staff) were not available in any of the Zonal Railway.
In Engineering departments, out of ten activities, norms for seven activities were not available on any of the Zonal Railways. Micro study regarding observance of norms/yardsticks, manpower planning in three departments was carried and the results are depicted in the following paragraphs.
4.12.1 Mechanical Department
Mechanical department handles three main maintenance activities i.e., carriages, wagons and diesel locomotives maintenance. The deployment of staff in two activities were reviewed with reference to existing norms and the findings are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Carriage Maintenance Activity
Norms for this activity were revised in December 2001 from 3.3 men per coach to 2.4 men per coach for primary maintenance. Test check of 99 Coaching Yards on 20 Divisions of the Zonal Railways except NF Railway revealed that 398 men were deployed in excess of the requirement resulting in extra expenditure of Rs.5.04 crore per annum. Railway wise position of excess deployment is given below:
In South Eastern Railway the excess deployment in seven Coaching yards was 264 men involving extra expenditure of Rs.3.34 crore per annum. The excess deployment of staff was on Southern Railway (39) in seven Coaching yards, Central Railway (37) in three Coaching yards, Northern Railway (23) in four Coaching yards, South Central (22) in two Coaching yards and North Eastern Railway (13) in three Coaching yards. The extra expenditure involved on these Railways was Rs.1.69 crore per annum. [Annexure XXXIII]
Diesel Loco Sheds
The Yardstick for maintenance staff in the Diesel Sheds has not been revised since 1979. A review of 27 Diesel Loco Sheds on the Zonal Railways except Northeast Frontier Railway revealed that the operated strength of staff was less than the staff requirement as per norms in all the Diesel sheds except Motibagh-Nagpur on South Eastern Railway where two men were deployed in excess. This would indicate that the norms fixed in 1979 call for downward revision.
4.12.2 Engineering Department
Engineering department (Open Line) is entrusted with maintenance of track, assets related to track and other works, acquisition and management of land and construction and maintenance of buildings and bridges. Audit reviewed the position of staff engaged for maintenance of tracks and the findings are discussed below:
Norms for calculation of gang strength for the maintenance of track are specified in the Report of Special Committee (1979) set up for evolving Gang strength Formula for uniform adoption on Indian Railways. Audit review of gang strength calculated as per norms, sanctioned strength and operated strength of gang men revealed the following:
Sanctioned strength was not revised to bring it at par with the requirement as assessed in terms of norms. As a result of this the sanctioned strength of gang men as on 31 March 2003 was more than the required strength on South Eastern (4318), Northern (3433). Western (2944), Eastern (2860), Central (881) and South Central (362) Railways.
While the overall operated strength was less than the required strength as per norms on almost all Railways except on Northern and Western, the operated strength on certain Divisions within the Railways was in excess. There were three Divisions each on Northern and Western, two on Central and one on Eastern Railways, which had excess staff. The excess deployment on Northern (1874), Western (759), Central (648) and Eastern Railway(648) involved extra expenditure of Rs.49.25 crore per annum.
A deeper analysis at the level of five sub offices on each of the 19 selected Divisions of the Zonal Railways revealed that out of 95 sub offices test checked, there was excess deployment from one to 188 gang men in 46 sub offices. The total excess deployment in 46 sub offices was of 1830 gang men resulting in extra expenditure of Rs.23.19 crore per annum. The sub-offices where the deployment was more than 25 per cent of the requirement are tabulated below:
|Name of Railway||Name of Division||Name of sub office (Chief Permanent Way Inspector/ Permanent Way Inspector/Section Engineer)||Percentage of excess deployment|
4.12.3 Electrical Department
Electrical department handles maintenance of electric locomotives, over-head equipment, sub-stations and distribution of power supply etc.
(I) Audit review of manpower for various activities required as per existing norms and actually deployed as on 31 March 2003 revealed that:
The operated strength of staff engaged in almost all the activities except three activities was less than the requirement. In one activity viz. General Power Supply, there was excess deployment of staff. Excess deployment was 588 on Eastern, 224 on Northeast Frontier and 85 on Western Railway involving extra expenditure of Rs.11.36 crore per annum.
The deployment of staff for maintenance of Electric locomotives was more by 48 men on Southern Railway involving extra expenditure of Rs.0.61 crore per annum.
On Western Railway, in traction distribution activity, 51 men were deployed in excess of requirement involving extra expenditure of Rs.0.65 crore per annum.
(ii) Norms for maintenance work of AC Coaches do not exist on Zonal Railways except Eastern Railway where 2.1 and 3.57 men per coach per day were prescribed for primary and secondary maintenance respectively. Test check of manpower deployed during March 2003 for AC coach maintenance activity was conducted in 20 yards of nine Zonal Railways applying Eastern Railway's norms and it was found that -
The actual deployment of manpower at Sealdah and Howrah yards on Eastern Railway was 11 and 3.85 men per coach per day as against prescribed combined average deployment of 2.84 men per coach per day.
The deployment of 7.26 men per coach per day at Lucknow yard of Northern, 7.09 men per coach per day at Guwahati of Northeast Frontier, 5.95 men per coach per day at Chennai Egmore of Southern and 4.5 & 3.79 men per coach per day at Tata & Santragachi yards respectively on South Eastern Railways indicate that action is required to fix norms and distribute the existing manpower judiciously.
4.13 Rightsizing of manpower through Bench Marking
Benchmarking is a method of determining the minimum manpower per unit of representative workload. A comparison of manpower per unit engaged for similar activities in different Railways and adopting the best figure as a benchmark has been recognised as the best solution for rightsizing manpower. RITES in their report had indicated that there was considerable variation from Railway to Railway in respect of number of track men per Equated Track Kilometre (ETKM) in Civil Engineering department and had recommended for similar comparison in other activities to achieve economy through proper deployment of manpower.
4.13.1 A workshop of Railway Officers was held in May 1991 to discuss the recommendations of RITES and chalk out an action plan. In the Action Plan for Civil Engineering it was agreed that if all Zonal Railways adopted the best figure of track men per ETKM. of South Eastern Railway having 1.68 track men per ETKM (in 1991-92) as against all India average of 2.12 track men per ETKM, there would be saving of about 61,000 employees.
The implementation of this benchmark was reviewed in audit and it was found that:
The deployment of staff during the year 2002-03 on Northern and Central Railways was 2.15 and 1.82 track men per ETKM respectively. The failure of these two Railways to bring down the deployment to 1.68 track men per ETKM resulted in excess staff of 9,857 on Northern and 2,793 on Central Railways. The extra expenditure involved was Rs.12.63 crore and 5.13 crore per month respectively.
The deployment of staff on Western (1.72 per ETKM) and Southern (1.69 per ETKM) Railways was also slightly higher than the benchmark of 1.68 track men per ETKM.
The deployment of staff per ETKM on all other Railways showed more than the expected reduction and ranged from 1.15 track men per ETKM on South Central to 1.56 track men per ETKM on North Eastern Railway. 4.13.2 In the Action Plan (May 1991), Central, Northern and Western Railways, where the deployment of track men was 2.34, 2.45 and 2.69 track men per ETKM respectively, were specifically asked to make in-depth study for identification of surplus labour on P.Way and bring deployment of staff per ETKM to All India level. Audit found that the efforts put forth by these Railways to bring down the manpower deployment to the All India level were not sufficient. The All India average deployment of track men during the year 2002-03 was 1.58 per ETKM and the deployment on Northern (2.15), Central (1.82), and Western (1.72) track men per ETKM continued to be above All India average. The deployment of 1.69 track men per ETKM on Southern Railway was also above All India level. There is scope for reduction of around 20884 track men on these Railways which would result in a saving of Rs.22.04 crore per month.
4.13.3 Immediate action to initiate similar exercise to right size the manpower in respect of other activities should also have been taken by Railways to bring about parity in deployment of its existing manpower. However, the process was initiated only in August 2000. This exercise is being carried out by Efficiency & Research Directorate on Indian Railways. So far two study reports on Benchmarking have been forwarded for time bound implementation to all Zonal Railways & Production Units by Railway Board in May 2001 and May 2002 covering 12 major activities & five indirect activities respectively. By adopting these benchmarks as a goal to be attained by each activity centre, there is a considerable potential of improving manpower productivity.
The exercise of fixing upper benchmark was to be completed by 30 September 2001. It was also directed that till the above exercise is completed, no fresh induction of staff (including compassionate appointees) was to be made in Divisions/units where the average strength as indicated in the benchmarking report was above the benchmark.
A test check conducted on 19 selected Divisions of Zonal Railways revealed that the exercise of fixing upper benchmark limit in respect of 12 major and five indirect activities in almost all the Divisions has not been completed except on Eastern and Western Railways. Eastern and Western Railways have completed the exercise of fixing upper benchmark for ten out of 12 major activities. The two remaining activities were in respect of Buildings and Bridges. Western Railway completed the exercise in respect three out of five indirect activities.
4.14 Manpower assessment for Workshops
4.14.1 Railway Administration has invested huge amounts in modernisation of workshops with a view to increase productivity in workshops and large number of semi-skilled trades have been reclassified as skilled to increase the availability of skilled workforce. These developments have a direct impact on the productivity and allowed time for various jobs in workshops. Due to revision in allowed time and closure of certain activities, the staff have become surplus. Test check was conducted in 26 workshops on nine Zonal Railways to find out the impact of modernisation and action taken by Railways to reduce the staff. The findings are given below:
In Liluah and Kanchrapara workshops on Eastern Railway due to modernisation of certain activities, a large number of staff was identified as surplus during the year 2001-02 to 2002-03. The actual reduction in staff was either not effected or was effected after a delay ranging from one to 21 months resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.71.74 crore.
The repair of LB springs in Ponmalai (Golden Rock) and closure of carriage repair shop in Perambur workshops of Southern Railway was effected from November 2001 and March 2003 respectively. However, 21 and 190 staff identified surplus in these activities respectively has not been reduced from the staff strength (June 2003) resulting in unproductive expenditure of Rs.0.80 crore.
In Gorakhpur Workshop of North Eastern Railway, 142 employees were identified as surplus in July 2002. There was average delay of 3.5 months in effecting actual reduction in staff strength resulting in avoidable expenditure of Rs.0.52 crore.
4.14.2 Manpower requirement of various activities in a Workshop is dependent on the target set for production of various items. Non-achievement of targets would thus indicate idling of manpower. Test check of certain shops engaged in various activities in the 26 Workshops of nine Zonal Railways was conducted for the year 2001-02 to 2002-03 to compare the manpower deployed, targets set for the year and actual outturn. The test check revealed that the shortfall in achieving the targets ranged from 2.42 per cent to 89.33 per cent. Based on the actual outturn, the manpower deployment in the shops test checked was in excess by 5,215 on all Railways during the year 2001-02 and 3,459 during the year 2002-03 resulting in extra expenditure of Rs.66.05 crore and 43.80 crores respectively. The Railway-wise position is tabulated below:
|Railway||No. of excess staff||Extra Expenditure (In crore rupees)|
4.15 Manpower planning for Construction Organisation Each Zonal Railway has a Construction Organisation headed by Chief Administrative Officers. The main functions of this organisation are construction of new lines, bridges etc. Assessment of manpower requirement for the construction organisation is generally done on the basis of the provision in the estimates relating to the works to be executed by this organisation. All the posts thus created are called 'Work charged posts'.
4.15.1 Creation & Extension of currency of Gazetted Posts
For every financial year yardstick for the creation/ extension of Gazetted staff for construction project is fixed by the Railway Board. According to these yardsticks, proposals for creation/ extension of number of gazetted posts are sent by the concerned executives departments to FA&CAO (C) for concurrence. The proposal shows the details of the outlay for the year in respect of the works to be executed by the concerned department and also gives the list of the works where provision for the proposed staff exist. These Proposals are scrutinised by the Accounts department after verifying all the facts & figures and the vetted proposals are sent back to the concerned department to take the sanction of the competent authority. Proposals for creation/extension of SAG level posts are required to be sanctioned by Railway Board. Other proposals of Gazetted staff are sanctioned by the CAO (C).
The yardsticks for creation of posts for the year 2000-01 prescribed by Railway Board stipulate that in Civil, Electrical and S&T Departments the total number of posts in Junior Scale/ Class II and Senior Scale posts should be determined by taking these posts together and not separately. It was also stipulated that the number of posts in Senior Scale should be kept at about one half of the Junior Scale posts. The formula to calculate the posts in these categories was that the number of posts in Junior Scale multiplied by the monetary yardstick per post plus the number of posts in Senior Scale multiplied by the yardstick per post should equal to the total outlay. From the year 2001-02 onward a further cut of ten per cent was to be applied on the posts calculated as per above formula.
Audit review of the creation and operation of the Gazetted posts for the year 2001-02 to 2002-03 in Civil and Electrical Departments was carried out and findings are discussed in the following paragraphs:
Test check of posts required on the basis of prescribed norms revealed that:
During the year 2000-01, one post in Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) on South Central, four posts in Junior Administrative Grade (JAG) out of which, three were on South Eastern Railway alone were in excess of the requirement. In Senior Scale (SS) out of 36 excess posts, the excess was mainly on Northern (20), South Central (nine), Central (five), Eastern and South Eastern (one each). The excess deployment of ten posts in Junior Scale (JS) was eight on South Central and one each on North Eastern and South Eastern Railways. The deployment of posts in excess of the prescribed norms resulted in extra expenditure of Rs.0.65 crore. During 2001-02, two SAG posts one each on Southern and South Eastern, 18 JAG posts out of which six each were on South Central and South Eastern, three on Southern, two on Western Railway and one on North Eastern Railways were operated in excess of the norms. Out of 56 excess posts in SS, 25 were on Southern Railway, ten were on South Central, seven were on South Eastern, five each on Central and Western, two on Eastern and one each on North Eastern and Northeast Frontier Railways. In JS out of 39 excess posts 13 were on South Eastern, ten on South Central, eight on Western, five on Northeast Frontier and three on North Eastern Railways. The total extra expenditure involved works out to Rs.1.46 crore. During the year 2002-03, the number of posts operated in excess than the requirement were two in SAG , five in JAG, 30 in SS and 11 in JS. Out of 31 posts in SS, 14 were on Southern, 11 on Central and one on South Central Railways. The total extra expenditure involved works out toRs.0.61 crore.
[Annexure XLI (i)]
Test check of posts required as per norms and actually operated reveal that:
During the year 2000-01, out of four excess post in JAG, two were on Southern and one each on South Central and South Eastern Railways. Out of 14 excess posts in SS, five were on South Central and three each on Central, Southern & Western, two on Northeast Frontier and one each on Eastern, Northern and South Eastern Railways. 12 posts in JS were operated in excess of the norms and the excess was on Eastern (five), South Central (four) and South Eastern (three). The extra expenditure involved works out to Rs.0.44 crore.
During the year 2001-02, out seven excess posts in JAG, three were on South Eastern Railway alone. Out of 23 excess posts in SS, nine were on Central, four on Western, three on South Eastern, two each on Southern & South Central and one each on Eastern, Northeast Frontier & Northern Railways. Out of eight posts operated in excess in JS, five were on South Eastern and three on South Central Railways. The extra expenditure involved works out to Rs.0.48 crore.
During the year 2002-03, the excess posts operated were SAG (one), JAG (two), SS (14) and JS (five). The excess in SS was mainly on Central (five) and Western (four) Railways. The extra expenditure was to the tune of Rs.0.28 crore. [Annexure XLI(ii)]
4.15.2 Delay in redeployment/non-deployment of staff
As soon as the work on a sanctioned project is near completion, the Railway Administration should take immediate action for assessing the further requirement of staff and the staff that is not required should be re-deployed elsewhere. Audit review the position of staff management on the works/project which were completed or were near completion and found that -
In Central Railway, 333 posts were declared surplus during the period 2000-01 and 2002-03. These surplus posts could not be re-deployed till 31 March 2003 as the Open Line Organisation was not willing to take them. Non-deployment of these staff has resulted in unproductive of expenditure of Rs.4.13 crore.
Northern Railway Construction Organisation has declared 1,413 posts of staff as surplus to the requirement after completion of certain works in 1999. However, the re-deployment process was very slow and even after 4 years, 79 persons were to be re-deployed (March 2003). The delay in re-deployment/non-deployment has resulted in unproductive expenditure of Rs.30.01 crore.
4.16 Bungalow Peons
Bungalow Peons are provided at the residences of the certain officers who, by the nature of their duties, were called upon to be available round the clock to attend to emergencies such as interruption to traffic, accidents, mishaps, agitation & other operational problems which needed immediate attention, and in discharging these functions the assistance of the bungalow peons was needed. In terms of Board's criteria fixed in 1956, General Managers were entitled for two bungalow peons and other Administrative Officers one each provided the nature of their duties justify the sanctioning of bungalow peon.
The third pay commission recommended (March 1973) that “the system of providing peons at the residences of certain categories of officers is an anachronism and should be done away with”. In December 1974, a committee appointed by the Board recommended that only General Manager, Head of Departments & Secretary to General Managers may be allowed bungalow peons and no officer of Stores, Accounts, Vigilance, Medical, Civil Engineering & Personnel Departments in the Divisions & Headquarters (except Head of Departments) should be allowed bungalow peons. After considering these recommedations, Railway Board referred (January 1978) them to the General Managers for their views in. The General Managers favoured continuance of the existing provision of bungalow peons.
A comment regarding continuous unjustified engagement of peons at the residences of various officers despite availability of advanced communication network was made in the Report of Comptroller & Auditor General of India- Union Government (Railways) for the year 1989-90. Consequently Railway Board had felt the need for review of posts of bungalow peons attached to officers lower than Administrative Grade and instructed Zonal Railways to make critical review immediately.
Audit review of engagement of bungalow peons during the period 1998-99 to 2002-03 revealed that:
The strength of Bungalow peons as on 31st March 2003 was highest on South Eastern (264) followed by Northern (183), Western (139), Central (127), Northeast Frontier (126), Southern (113), North Eastern (83), Eastern (58), ) and South Central (33). The total expenditure incurred on engagement of bungalow peons during the review period works out to Rs.38.76 crore.
The engagement of bungalow peons for officer below the rank of Administrative Grade was also highest on South Eastern Railway (62) followed by Southern (nine), Central (seven) and Eastern (four). The expenditure incurred on engagement of bungalow peons for officers below the rank of Administrative Grade during the review period was 2.47 crore.
On Western 15 bungalow peons were attached with the officers belonging to Stores, Accounts and EDP departments. Out of these, eight were provided to officers other than Heads of Departments whose duties do not justify the engagement of bungalow peons.
4.17 Reorganisation of Zonal Railways
Railway Board issued a notification on 14 June 2002 for creation of North Western Railway (NWR) and East Central Railway (ECR) with effect from 1 October 2002. NWR has been created by carving out certain divisions of Northern and Western Railways and ECR by carving out certain divisions of North Eastern and Eastern Railway. Another notification has been issued on 4 July 2002 for creation of East Coast Railway, South Western Railway, West Central Railway, North Central Railway & South East Central Railway with effect from 1 April 2003. Due to this reorganisation, posts and personnel were transferred from the existing zones to the newly created zones.
A review was conducted in Audit on Eastern, Northern, North Eastern and Western Railways to see whether the posts identified for transfer to new Zonal Railways, which came into being from 1 October 2002, were actually transferred. The findings are as follows:
In Eastern Railway, 2,626 posts were identified for transfer to newly created ECR. However, out of 1,961 live posts, only 136 posts were actually transferred till 1 July 2003 leaving excess staff strength of 1,825 on Eastern Railway without any justifiable work In North Eastern Railway a total of 944 posts (688 live and 256 vacant) were identified for transfer to ECR. Out of 688 live posts only 318 staff were actually transferred The posts of 370 staff have been declared supernumerary and are being operated on NE Railway without any justified work resulting in unproductive expenditure of Rs.0.39 crore per month. In Northern Railway 559 posts were identified for transfer to newly created NWR. Out of these, only 272 posts were actually transferred. The information regarding the number of live posts identified for transfer was not available.
In Western Railway, 643 posts were identified for transfer to NWR. The information regarding the number live posts identified for transfer was not available. However, it was noticed that 398 staff was transferred to NWR on the basis of their willingness.
From the above it is evident that excess staff remain on Eastern, North Eastern, Northern and Western Railways without any justified work. Since the transfer of Group B, C & D staff has been done on the basis of options and number of staff willing to move to new Zonal Railways is less, Indian Railway is now facing a situation of lop-sided distribution of manpower in various Zonal Railways throwing the whole exercise of manpower planning discussed in the earlier part of the review into disarray. The Railways should have sorted out the matter regarding manpower deployment before embarking on the reorganisation of the Zonal Railways.
Indian Railways had recognised the importance of manpower planning more than a decade ago when RITES was appointed to undertake a diagnostic study to identify the strengths and weaknesses of its manpower existing at that time. The Railways have brought down the manpower strength from 16.52 lakh in 1991 to 15.11 lakhs as on 31 March 2002 but the reduction is not enough if one consider the changes in operational technologies in Indian Railway by way of modernisation, computerisation and mechanisation of track maitenance. Audit review has revealed that 5,921 posts identified as surplus in work studies conducted during the review period continue to be operated. Several other areas were also noticed by Audit where surrender of staff is warranted. Benchmarking, which has been recognised as an effective method of rightsizing, has been implemented in a very tardy fashion. Efforts to reduce the manpower strength by way of restricting intake has also not been very effective. The intake through compassionate appointments has been heavy and an anachronistic practice of engaging bungalow peons continues. The re-organisation of Zonal Railways in likely to prove a big setback in the Railway's efforts to rightsize manpower.